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LOCATION MATTERS: HOW NUISANCE GOVERNS
ACCESS TO PROPERTY FOR FREE EXPRESSION
SARAH E. HAMILLt
I. INTRODUCTION
In the 1991 case of Committee for the Commonwealth of Canada v Canada,
the Supreme Court of Canada recognized that some instances of free
expression require a location.' Yet not all locations, even those locations that
might be considered public, are necessarily available for free expression.
Given that the Supreme Court has declared free expression to be a key
democratic right,2 and that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
PhD Candidate and Sessional Instructor, University ofAlberta, Faculty of Law. I would
like to thank the two peer reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions. This
article is something of a companion piece to "Private Rights to Public Property: The
Evolution of Common Property in Canada" (2012) 58:2 McGill LJ 365.
[1991] 1 SCR 139 at 153,77 DLR (4th) 385, Lamer CJC [Commonwealth ofCanada].
See also Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority v Canadian Federation ofStudents-
British Columbia Component, 2009 SCC 31 at para78, [2009] 2 SCR 295 [GVTA]. For
non-judicial pronouncements of the importance of location to free expression, see e.g.
Richard Moon "Freedom of Expression and Property Rights" (1988) 52:2 SaskLRev 243
at 244 [Moon, "Freedom of Expression"]; Richard Moon, "Access to Public and Private
Property Under Freedom of Expression" (1988) 20:2 Ottawa L Rev 339 [Moon,
"Access"]; Richard Moon, The Constitutional Protection of Freedom of Expression
(Toronto: University ofToronto Press, 2000) at 3-4 [Moon, Constitutional Protection];
Brian Slattery, "Freedom of Expression and Location: Are There Constitutional Dead
Zones?" (2010) 51 Sup Cc L Rev (2d) 245 at 245; Timothy Zick, "Property, Place, and
Public Discourse" (2006) 21 Wash UJL & Pol'y 173 at 173. Free expression is protected
in Canada by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 2(b), Part I of the
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), c 11[ Charter].
2 See EdmontonjournalvAlberta (Attorney General), [1989] 2 SCR 1326 at 1336, 1352-
53, 64 DLR (4th) 577.
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famously does not mention property rights,' it might be expected that free
expression would trump property rights, or, at the very least, grant some right
of access, particularly to public property.' However, an examination of the
section 2(b) jurisprudence strongly suggests that this is not the case, and that
free expression is subordinated to the primary purpose ofthe propertywhere
it is located.
This article argues that in cases dealing with access to property,
particularly publicly accessible property, for the purposes of free expression,
the jurisprudence contains an underlying logic of nuisance.' By "logic of
nuisance" I mean that the courts, implicitly or explicitly, compare instances
of free expression to nuisances and use a similar kind of balancing as seen
under traditional nuisance law. The logic ofnuisance shares some similarities
with the traditional law of nuisance in that both involve balancing apparently
competing uses ofland and both concern themselves with disturbances, such
as excessive noise and unpleasant smells. Where the logic of nuisance differs
from traditional nuisance law is that it is not about reciprocal rights between
adjacent properties, but about competing uses ofpublic property and spaces.
The result of this logic of nuisance is that the courts prefer instances of free
expression that are quiet and relatively unobtrusive, and do not interfere with
the role of the property on which the expression takes place. Traditional
nuisance law may have the "difficult task of maximizing mutual autonomy
while making it possible for us to live together'6 but when applied to public
property and spaces, the logic of nuisance has a long history of being used to
3 See Alexander Alvaro, "Why Property Rights Were Excluded from the Canadian Charter
ofRights and Freedoms" (1991) 24:2 Can J Pol Sc 309; Bruce Ziff, "'Taking' Liberties:
Protections for Private Property in Canada" in Elizabeth Cooke, ed, Modern Studies in
Property Law, vol 3 (Oxford: Hart, 2005) 341.
4 For an earlier discussion of the relationship between property and free expression see
Moon, "Access", supra note 1; Moon, "Freedom of Expression", supra note 1. See also
WWesley Pue & Robert Diab, "The Gap in Canadian Police Powers: Canada Needs
Public Order Policing Legislation" (2010) 28:1 Windsor Rev Legal Soc Issues 87 at 102-
05.
s Timothy Zick argues that in the United States public expression is also seen as a nuisance.
See Zick, supra note 1 at 177, 184.
6 Gregory S Pun & Margaret I Hall, The Law ofNuisance in Canada (Markham, Ont:
LexisNexis, 2010) at 1.
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sanitize the public sphere.7 Its appearance in the section 2(b) jurisprudence
results in concerns about property trumping or restricting the right to
free expression.
As keen as Canadian courts are to portray the right to free expression as a
deeply important right, they are equally keen to promote respect for the law.'
In cases involving section 2(b) claims, individuals must first show that the
right has been infringed, and then they must show that the infringement is
not saved by section 1 of the Charter.' In section 2(b) cases that also involve
the access and use of public property, the courts necessarily balance the
competing uses of the property at issue. In the context ofan individual's right
to access and use public property for the purposes of free expression, the
courts'respect for the law means that they can be too quick to defer to the
government's use and regulation of property rather than protect the right to
free expression.o The courts also fail to examine whether the individual
attempting to express herself on public property has another forum for
expression; instead, they focus on whether the expression at issue fits with
the traditional use of the public property."
Two recent lower court decisions are paradigmatic of the courts'
reasoning in cases of accessing property for the purposes of free expression:
Batty v City ofToronto, which arose out of litigation surrounding the Occupy
Toronto movement, 2 and R v Whatcott, which dealt with the
constitutionality of a trespass order issued in respect of the University of
7 See e.g. Peter C Hennigan, "Property War: Prostitution, Red-Light Districts, and the
Transformation of Public Nuisance Law in the Progressive Era" (2004) 16:1 Yale JL &
Human 123.
8 See Jamie Cameron, "A Reflection on Section 2(b)'s Quixotic Journey, 1982-2012"
(2012) 58 Sup Ct L Rev (2d) 163 at 168 [Cameron, "Reflection"].
9 For an early critique of this two-step test, see Michael Kanter, "Balancing Rights under
Section 2(b) of the Charter: Case Comment on Committee for the Commonwealth of
Canada v Canada" (1992) 17:2 Queen's LJ 489 at 494.
'o See Part II, below.
The situation regarding private property is a little different. See infra notes 18-20, 122-
23 and accompanying text.
12 2011 ONSC 6862, 108 OR (3d) 571 [Batty].
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Calgary's campus.' Of the two cases, Batty arguably received more press
attention due to the widespread media coverage of the global Occupy
movement." Although there are a handful of other Canadian Occupy
movement cases, to date Batty is the case that has received the fullest judicial
consideration." Given the nature of Occupy Toronto's protest-the
continuous "occupation" of a public park in downtown Toronto-Batty
contains a revealing commentary on property rights. In contrast, Whatcott
focused on whether the University of Calgary could ban William Whatcott
from its campus simply because he distributed pamphlets that others found
offensive. Whatcott is but the latest case arising out ofWhatcott's actions, 6
and throughout this article I make reference to his other cases as they often
provide an interesting contrast to similar Supreme Court of Canada cases.
Before I examine Batty and Whatcott in more depth, it is necessary to
outline the current law on the right to access and use property for free
expression. I begin in Part II with an examination of Supreme Court cases
where the location of the free expression formed a key part of the case.
Through an examination of these cases, I tease out the guidelines for people
wishing to express themselves on public property and for governments
seeking to regulate such expression. Part III compares the decisions in Batty
and Whatcott to show how both of these cases comply with the implicit logic
of nuisance. Part IV explores the problems with this logic of nuisance and
13 2012ABQB 231, 538 AR 220 [Whatcott].
1 See e.g. David Schneiderman, "Free speech and dog walking", Toronto Star (28 November
2011) online: Toronto Star <http://www.thestar.com>. But see Daryl Slade, "Judge says
U of C ban on distributing anti-gay flyer violated man's rights", Calgary Herald (16
November 2011) B5.
15 There have also been court cases arising out ofOccupy Vancouver and Occupy Calgary. In
the former instance, the case has yet to come to trial, while in the latter the movement
struggled to get adequate legal representation. See Vancouver (City) v O'Flynn-Magee,
2011 BCSC 1647,342 D LR (4th) 190; Calgary (City) v Bullock (Occupy Calgary), 2011
ABQB 764, 545 AR 5.
6 See e.g. R v Whatcott, 2005 SKQB 302, [2005] 11 WWR 338; R v Whatcott, 2002 SKQB
399, [2003] 4 WWR 149 [ Whatcott 2002]; Whatcott v Saskatchewan (Human Rights
Tribunal), 2013 SCC 11, 355 DLR (4th) 383; Whatcott v Saskatchewan Association of
Licensed PracticalNurses, 2008 SKCA 6, 289 DLR (4th) 506.
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argues that it unduly restricts free expression, particularly when that
expression takes place on public property.
II. DON'T BE A NUISANCE: ACCESSING AND USING
PROPERTY FOR FREE EXPRESSION
In this section, I outline the law governing access to and use of property,
including both publicly accessible and private property, for the purposes of
free expression. Regardless of whether property is public or private, the
public's rights of access to and use of property are well regulated. The
Charter did not grant and has not been interpreted as granting a blanket
right of access to property for the purposes of free expression." Instead, it is
for the courts to decide whether and when publicly accessible property can
be used as a site for free expression. Through an examination of the case law
on both expressive behaviour and the government's attempts to regulate
public property, I argue that the jurisprudence betrays a preference for
certain kinds of expression over others, even if the courts have, on occasion,
upheld less desirable forms of expression. In the context of section 2(b)
claims, the Supreme Court grants wide discretion to public bodies tasked
with regulating public property and reveals a preference for quiet,
unobtrusive, and cost-free expression and the peaceful enjoyment of
property. Intentionally or not, this privileges the free expression of those with
private property rights or the resources needed to undertake the kind of
expression the Court prefers.
In the context of publicly accessible property-by which I mean property
that is held out as open to the public regardless of whether it is privately or
publicly owned-whether a person has the right to free expression on that
property depends on whether certain criteria are met. If the property is
privately owned, it is almost certain that non-owners will not have the right
to access and use that property for the purposes of free expression.18 Despite
* See WWesley Pue & Robert Diab, "The Gap in Canadian Police Powers: Canada Needs
Public Order Policing Legislation" (2010) 28 Windsor Rev Legal Soc Issues 87 at 103
(noting that there is "a sliding scale of protection ... [for] different places in different
circumstances"). See also GVTA, supra note 1 at para 28 ("[trhe method or location of
expression may exclude it from protection").
* See e.g. Harrison v Carswell (1975), [1976] 2 SCR 200,62 DLR (3d) 68 [Harrison].
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the early hopes of both Moe Litman and Richard Moon that, as Moon put it,
Canadian "courts could look to the state act which empowers the private
property owner '9 that has not come to pass. As the Supreme Court noted in
2005, "[p]rivate property ... will fall outside the protected sphere ofs. 2(b)
absent state imposed limits on expression, since state action is necessary to
implicate the Canadian Charter."20 In short, private owners are perfectly
entitled to prohibit protesters from their property and in some provinces are
empowered by trespass legislation to declare certain behaviours trespass.2 '
There are two possible ways around the Charter's inapplicability to
private property: labour legislation and provincial human rights codes. The
former typically allows striking employees to picket on their employer's
property.22 As for the latter, prior to the decision in Whatcott, William
Whatcott won a similar case in Saskatchewan in which one ofhis grounds of
challenge was that an anti-littering bylaw violated the Saskatchewan Human
Rights Code." In Whatcott 2002, Whatcott was charged and convicted of
littering contrary to the University of Saskatchewan's traffic and parking
bylaws. 24Although the Court of Queen's Bench found that the bylaws were
1 Moon, "Access", supra note 1 at 366; MM Litman, "Freedom of Speech and Private
Property: The Case of the Mall Owner" in David Schneiderman, ed, Freedom of
Expression and The Charter (Scarborough, Ont: Carswell, 1991)361 at 4 00-01, 4 03-06.
20 Montrial (City) v 2952-1366QudbecInc, 2005 SCC 62 at para 62, [2005]3 SCR 141
[Quebec Inc].
21 See e.g. TrespassAct, RSBC 1996, c 4 62,As 4(1)(c); Trespass toPropertyAct, RSO 1990, c
T.21, s4(1); Trespass to Property Act, SS 2009, c T-20.2, s4(2); Trespass to Premises Act,
RSA 2000, c T-7; Trespass toPropertyAct, RSPEI 1988, c T-6,s 2(1)(e)-(f); TrespassAct,
SNB 2012, c 117.
22 See e.g. Cadillac Fairview Corporation Ltd v RWDSU (1989),71 OR (2d) 206,64 DLR
(4th) 267 (CA) at 217-221 [Cadillac Fairview]. The legislation in question was the
Labour RelationsAct, RSO 1980, c 228. This legislation did not, however, grant a blanket
right of access and applied only to property where there was a standing invitation for the
public to enter. See Queen's University at Kingston v CUPE, Local 229 (1994), 120 DLR
(4th) 717 at 725,76 OAC 356 [Queen's University].
23 SS 1979, c S-24.2, s 5; Whatcott 2002, supra note 16 at para 11.
2 The issue ofwhether university property counts as private property is explored below. See
infra notes 119-27.
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ultra vires the university, the Court briefly commented on how the
Saskatchewan Human Rights Code would apply. The Court found that the
relevant sections of the university's parking bylaws would be rendered
inoperative under the Saskatchewan Human Rights Code "to the extent [the
bylaws] [limit] the otherwise legal expression ofpersonal views and beliefs".25
In the context of publicly owned and accessible property, Canadian
courts have adopted the historical use test, which functions as an inversion of
the American public forum doctrine.26 Rather than adopting the public
forum doctrine and using it to extend protections for free expression to
properties like malls, Canadian courts developed the historical use test,
which limits free expression to only those instances ofpublic property where
"the historical or actual function of the place" is such that "one would expect
constitutional protection for free expression". In otherwords, the historical
use test will not open up new spaces for free expression; it will merely offer a
way to define which spaces already allow expression. In practice, the
historical use test seems to require that the courts examine both the function
of the place and the behaviour of the individual claiming an infringement of
section 2(b), as the behaviour must be compatible with the function.28 As
such, the historical use test echoes the well-known limits on free expression:
time, place, and manner. The idea that the public should not be excluded
from public property seems implicit in the historical use test, as, presumably,
if the expression is compatible with the historical use test the public will
continue to be able to use it. Yet the public's rights with respect to public
property often appear only indirectly, typically through the justifications
public bodies or governments give for restricting the property's use.
While the historical use test coalesced in Quebec Inc, it was arguably only
a clarification of the approach seen in earlier cases. In BCGEU v British
25 Whatcott 2002, supra note 16 at para 37.
26 Since its introduction, the impact of the public forum doctrine has been much restricted;
for a history of the American public forum doctrine, see Zick, supra note 1 at 174-76.
27 Quebec Inc, supra note 20 at para 74. For a critique of this test, see Slattery, supra note 1 at
262-67.
2s Compare with the development of the American public forum doctrine. See Zick, supra
note 1 at 174-76.
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Columbia (Attorney General),29 for example, the Supreme Court held that an
injunction prohibiting picketing outside courts was constitutional because
the picketers were threatening to impede the operation of justice.30 The
Court did find that picketing is expressive and noted that the picketing in
this case was peaceful, non-violent, and did not destroy property." The issue
with the protest was that its location was unsuitable because it impeded the
public's right of access to and use of the courts."
BCGEUdid not, however, seriously examine the public's right to access
and use public property in the way that Commonwealth ofCanada did. At
issue in Commonwealth ofCanada was whether individuals could hand out
pamphlets in the public hall of Montreal's Dorval airport. As "there was no
underlying statutory or common law right to access the location in question",
the Supreme Court had to decide whether or not section 2(b) of the Charter
"ought to warrant a right of access to the location" The government
attempted to argue that it had all of the same property rights as a private
owner and was entitled to prevent the Committee for the Commonwealth of
Canada or, for that matter, anyone else from distributing leaflets in the
airport."Although the Supreme Court disagreed with the government and
unanimously found that the prohibition on handing out leaflets violated
section 2(b) of the Charter, the Court produced different explanations as to
why that was. Moon criticized the Court's various approaches as giving
"either complete or partial priority to the state's use of its property over
communicative access."3 5
2 [1988] 2 SCR 214, 53 DLR (4th) 1 [BCGEUcited to SCR].
30 Ibid at paras 15, 58, 68, 71.
31 Ibid at para 58.
32 Ibid at paras 31, 67-72.
1 Criminal Lawyers'Assn v Ontario (Ministry ofPublic Safety andSecurity), 2007 ONCA
392 at para 39, 86 OR (3d) 259.
Commonwealth ofCanada, supra note 1 at 154.
Richard Moon,"Out of Place: Comment on Committeeforthe Commonwealth ofCanada
v Canada" (1992-93) 38:1 McGill LJ 204 at 208 [Moon, "Out of Place"]. See generally
Slattery, supra note 1 at 250-59.
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When it came to discussing the nature of government-owned property,
the Court produced three ways to understand such property. Lamer CJ.C.
and SopinkaJ. found that government-owned property is really held in trust
rather than privately owned.36 This judgment echoes the traditional trust
analogy ofgovernment-owned property that has long existed in the common
law world. In contrast, LaForestJ. thought that the government or Crown
had all the same proprietary rights as a private owner, subject only to the
Charter.38 LaForest J.'s judgement was the only one to rely on this
understandingof government property, as CoryJ. stated that he agreed with
Lamer C.J.C. with respect to the question of access but agreed with
L'Heureux Dub6 J.'s conclusion, 9 while Gonthier J. expressed agreement
with "several elements" of Lamer C.J.C. and L'Heureux Dub6 J.'s reasoning
but overall concurred with McLachlin J. (as she then was). 0 Justice
L'Heureux-Dub6 echoed the idea ofgovernment property only being held in
trust,"' but found that depending on the circumstances "those areas
traditionally associated with, or resembling," sites of free expression could
have some restrictions on free expression imposed on them.42 justice
McLachlin offered a third way to understand government property, which
she has since reiterated, suggesting that it is now good law.3 Justice
McLachlin introduced the concept of private government property and
36 Commonwealth of Canada, supra note 1 at 154.
1 For an in-depth discussion of the history of the trust analogy-known as the public trust
doctrine in the United States-se Constance D Hunt, "The Public Trust Doctrine in
Canada" inJohn Swaigen, ed,EnvironmentalRightsin Canada (Toronto: Butterworths,
1981) 151 at 152-63; Kate Penelope Smallwood, Coming out of Hibernation: The
Canadian Public Trust Doctrine (LLM Thesis, Faculty of Law, University of British
Columbia, 1993) [unpublished] at 12-93.
38 Commonwealth ofCanada, supra note 1 at 165.
3 Ibid at 226-27.
4 Ibid at 226.
' Ibid at 199.
42 Ibid at 225.
43 See Quebec Inc, supra note 20 at para 64.
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public government property. According to this understanding, the test for a
right of access to government-owned property is the state's use of its property.
With the exception of L'Heureux-Dub6 J., the justices'descriptions of
government property occurred under the first step of the test for Charter
violations: determining whether the right has been violated. It was only after
describing the property at issue did the judgments go on to examine whether
the government was entitled to restrict expression. Again, the judgments
disagree on this point: McLachlin J. concluded the prohibition was
overbroad," while Lamer C.J.C. and Sopinka J. did not think that the
airport regulations counted as a "law" which could be justified under
section 1.46
Although the decision in Commonwealth ofCanada has received much
academic attention," what is perhaps overlooked is its description of the
expressive behaviour.After all, each of the judgments-but particularly those
of McLachlin J. and of Lamer C.J.C. and Sopinka J.-required the form of
expression to comply with the function of the place. Commonwealth of
Canada involved only two members of the Committee for the
Commonwealth of Canada, "[e] quipped with portable placards, advertising
leaflets and magazines", with the goals of promoting "knowledge of their
group and their political goals" and "recruit[ing] members."" An RCMP
officer stopped them almost immediately and they were informed that their
activities violated the Government Airport Concession Operations
Regulations." The two members left the airport and filed a complaint in
* Commonwealth ofCanada, supra note 1 at 227-28. See also Moon, "Out of Place", supra
note 35 at 207,221.
1 Commonwealth ofCanada, supra note 1 at 250-51.
46 Ibid at 159-64.
41 See e.g. Moon, "Out of Place" supra note 35; Slattery, supra note 1 at 250-59; June Ross,
"Committeefor the Commonwealth ofCanada v Canada: Expression on Public Property"
(1990-91) 2:4 Const Forum Const 109; Kanter, supra note 9;Jamie Cameron, "ABumpy
Landing: The Supreme Court of Canada and Access to Public Airports under Section
2(b) of the Charter" (1992) 2 Media and Communications Law Review 91.
* Commonwealth of Canada, supra note 1 at 167.
* Ibid. See also Government Airport Concession Operations Regulations, Regulations
SOR/79-373.
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federal court.o In short, there were only two people involved in the
expressive activity, they limited their expression to conversation and printed
materials, and they appeared to cooperate immediately with the demands of
airport staff and security. Given the speed with which their efforts were shut
down, the two members had little chance to bother travellers or other
members of the public or to interfere with the function of the airport's
public hall.
The Court returned to appropriate uses ofpublic property in Ramsden v
Peterborough (City)." Ramsden focused on the constitutional validity of a
municipal bylaw that banned all postering on public property. The case arose
when Kenneth Ramsden was charged under Peterborough's bylaw for putting
up posters on hydro poles advertisinghis band's upcoming performances. In a
unanimous judgment, the Supreme Court held that because the bylaw
represented an absolute ban, it violated section 2(b) of the Charter, and, even
though the bylaw's purpose had merit, it could not be saved under section 1
because it was overbroad.12
There was no doubt that the public had access to the hydro poles; what
was at issue was the use of the poles. Peterborough justified its ban on the
grounds that posters posed a safety hazard to workers and to traffic, caused
"aesthetic blight", and resulted in litter." The Court agreed with the city that
the purpose of its bylaw was "pressing and substantial"54 and made no
attempt to critically engage with Peterborough's claims about the dangers of
posters. The exact nature of the alleged threat to traffic was never clarified,
but if it really were the case that posters posed a traffic hazard, one might
expect roadside billboards to be equally hazardous and therefore equally
deserving of prohibition."
so Commonwealth of Canada, supra note 1 at 167.
5 [1993] 2 SCR 1084, 106 DLR (4th) 233 [Ramsden cited to SCR].
5 Ibidar 1107-08.
1 Ibid at 1104.
54 Ibidat 1105.
5 See also Vann Niagara Ltd v Oakville (Town) (2002), 60 OR (3d) I at para 28,214 DLR
(4th) 307 (CA) (noting the town had not advanced any hard evidence that billboards
were a driver distraction but accepting that they were likely a hazard regardless). But see
R v Whatcott, 2004 SKQB 413 at paras 5-6,246 DLR (4th) 695 (apeace officer's request
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Although the Court found a complete ban on postering on all public
property to be overbroad, in its discussion of acceptable alternatives it
revealed a preference for a certain kind of free expression. The Court
suggested that a more acceptable bylaw would allow postering but could
include provisions detailing how long posters may stay up and could even
include provisions for charging a fee for such postering." The idea of
charging a fee for postering seems somewhat distasteful given the Court's
discussion of postering being an inexpensive yet effective method of
communication.17 Although as Moon has noted, the Supreme Court
conceives of rights in an individualistic manner, meaning that it often fails to
examine the social aspect of certain rights, particularly free expression." In
the context of free expression, the Court understands freedom as absence of
interference," and, perhaps more importantly, prefers that such expression
not place a burden on the public or state. In Ramdsen this preference was
evidenced by the Court's tacit acceptance that posters could pose something
of a nuisance because of their potential to cause litter or aesthetic blight.
Ramsden suggests that the appropriate role of public property is to be
aesthetically pleasing and to facilitate safe circulation of traffic and
pedestrians.60 The case of Quebec Inc built on this understanding of public
for Whatcott to show less graphic anti-abortion photos on the grounds that they
distracted drivers was found to violate Whatcott's section 2(b) rights).
56 Ramsden, supra note 51 at 1107.
7 Ibid at 1096.
5 Richard Moon, "Justified Limits on Free Expression: The Collapse of the General
Approach to Limits on Charter Rights" (2002) 40:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 337 at 340 [Moon,
"Justified Limits"].
9 Ibid at 340. This understanding is not limited to section 2(b) cases. See e.g. Carissima
Mathen,"What Religious Freedom Jurisprudence RevealsAbout Equality"(2009) 6:2JL
& Equality 163 at 193 (noting that religious freedom cases better fit the "individual
autonomy model of liberal rights" than section 15 equality claims).
60 See generally Nicholas Blomley, "Civil Rights Meet Civil Engineering: Urban Public
Space and Traffic Logic" (2007) 22:2 CJLS 55 at 59 [Blomley, "Civil Rights"]; Nicholas
Blomley, "How to Turn a Beggar into a Bus Stop: Law, Traffic, and the 'Function of the
Place'" (2007) 44:9 Urban Studies 1697 at 1700,1702 [Blomley, "Beggar"]. See also Zick,
supra note 1 at 198.
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property by requiring that such property be peaceful. 6'At issue in QuebecInc
was Montreal's bylaw against noise produced on public streets by sound
equipment. The sound equipment in question was installed in the entrance
of a club in downtown Montreal that featured female dancers." The club
challenged its conviction under the bylaw on the grounds that it violated
section 2(b) of the Charter." Although the majority of the Court found that
the bylaw infringed section 2(b), they observed that Montreal did not have
other effective means to monitor and control sound levels in the city" and
hence found the bylaw to be proportional and thus saved by section 1.65 The
majority noted that Montreal included a provision in its bylaws whereby the
City could authorize the "use of sound equipment . .. for special events,
celebrations and demonstrations" and that the City had granted such
exceptions numerous times and in a non-arbitrary manner.66 Implicit in this
commentary is the idea that disruptive forms of free expression are only
allowed if the individuals in question have asked for permission and if the
disruptive expression will only be temporary.
In his dissent, Binnie J. raised some questions over the majority's claim
about the availability of exemptions. Justice Binnie observed that Montreal
would still have wide discretion to grant or not grant permits to use sound
equipment. As he put it, "[tjhe use of sound equipment to communicate an
otherwise unobjectionable message should not be subject to the discretion of
the City's Executive Committee, especially where, as here, the criteria for the
exercise of its discretion are not specified by the legislators."6 7 Yet the issue for
the majority was not simply the prohibition on sound equipment, but also
the bylaw's goal of preventing "disruptive noise"; as such, they found it would
Quebec Inc, supra note 20 at paras 14, 20, 22 (about peaceful enjoyment), 67
(about circulation).
62 Ibidatpara3.
6 Ibid at paras 3-6.
6 Ibid at paras 95-97.
61 Ibid at paras 90-99.
66 Ibid at para 90.
61 Ibid at para 171.
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not apply to all noises made by sound equipment.8 Although the majority
described the expression at issue in Quebec Inc as disruptive, it was not so
disruptive as to fail the historical use test." The disruptive element of the
expression only became relevant under the section I analysis. In other words,
the majority seemed to leave two decisions to the City's discretion: the first
being whether the noise produced was "disruptive", and the second being
whether the city would allow a permit for the use of noise equipment. The
balancing relevant in determining appropriate limits for free expression was
therefore left almost entirely to Montreal's discretion.
What is notable about Quebec Inc is that the expression at issue had its
origin on private property, though it spilled out onto the street. Indeed, the
whole point of the expression was to attract the public. Under the logic of
nuisance, municipalities like Montreal are entitled to regulate expression that
originates on private property but can be seen or heard from
public property.70
The case of R v Guignard provides an interesting contrast to the
decision in Quebec Inc. Like Quebec Inc, Guignard dealt with expression
arising on privately owned property, though the expression took the form of
a sign rather than noise produced by sound equipment. The sign at issue,
despite being attached to a privately owned building, violated the City of
Saint-Hyacinthe's bylaw that limited commercial signs to commercial or
industrial areas. The sign expressed Guignard's displeasure with an insurance
company, but his building was not located in a commercial or industrial
area.7 2 In Guignard, as in Ramsden, the municipal authority sought to defend
its bylaw as reasonable because it prevented "visual pollution and driver
distraction"." The bylaw failed to be saved under section 1 because the Court
6 Ibid at paras 33-34.
6'9 Ibid at para 81.
7o For more on municipalities'power to regulate private property, see Mariana Valverde,
Everyday Law on the Street: City Governance in an Age ofDiversity (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 2012) at 48-77 [Valverde, Everyday Law].
71 2002 SCC 14, [2002] 1 SCR 472 [Gugnard].
7 Ibid at paras 3-4.
73 Ibidat para 16.
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found that by only targeting commercial expression in non-commercial areas,
the bylaw was arbitrary, did not minimally impair the right to freedom of
expression, and was disproportionate. 4
What is interesting about Guignard is that the Court focused its
attention on freedom of expression rather than on the need to regulate
public spaces. Guignard may have owned his property, but, in Canada, the
courts have been broadly accepting of the fact that private property is subject
to strict regulation.7 ' The difference in Guignard is not simply that his
expression was located on private property, but that his expression met the
Court's preferences. The Court noted that "simple means of expression such
as posting signs or distributing pamphlets or leaflets, or... posting messages
on the Internet are the optimum means of communication for discontented
consumers."76 The Court observed that the media are often too expensive for
the ordinary person, whereas signs are "accessible and effective" and an
"optimum means ofexpression".77 The Court's comments about signs should
be contrasted with its comments on the distribution of leaflets, which the
Court thought would be "undoubtedly less effective "78
Yet when Guignardis read with the other jurisprudence on the access to
and use ofproperty for expression, the additional benefits ofGuignard's sign
becomes clear. First, by affixing a sign to his own building, Guignard bore the
cost of putting it up and taking it down, and did not cause any litter for the
city. As such, signs attached to buildings better fit the individualistic
understanding of free'expression that the Court currently has. Second,
Guignard's sign seems as though it would be less intrusive than handing out
leaflets: simply posting a sign leaves people free to look at it or not. Thus,
Guignard is not about opening up a space for free expression or imposing any
costs on the public.
7 Ibid at paras 28-32.
' See e.g. MarinerRealEstateLimited v Nova Scotia (AG) (1999), 178 NSR (2d) 294,177
DLR (4th) 696 (CA) ("ownership carries with it the possibility of stringent land use
regulation" at para 39).
76 Guignard, supra note 71 at para 25.
n Ibid at paras 25-26.
n Ibidatpara 30.
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The issue of opening up spaces for expression or imposing costs on the
public was implicit in the Court's reasoning in the 2009 case of GVTA. In
GVTA, the Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority (GVTA) refused to
post advertisements produced by the Canadian Federation of Students on
their buses because the GVTA's policies only allowed for commercial, not
political, expression on public transit vehicles.79 The GVTAclaimed that its
buses should be considered "private publicly owned property, to which one
cannot reasonably expect access."0 The Canadian Federation of Students
alleged that this policy violated their section 2(b) right to free expression
and, in a majority judgment, the Supreme Court agreed."
The expressive activity at issue in GVTA matched the Court's preference
for quiet, unobtrusive expression that does not impose costs on the public.
The Court went to some lengths to disprove GVTXs argument that allowing
access to advertising spaces amounted to a claim to a positive right.82 In
addition to not being a claim for a positive right, the Court found that
advertisements on buses did not "[impede] the primary function of the
bus ... nor, more importantly [undermine] the values underlying freedom of
expression"83 and as such met the historical use test set out in Quebec Inc."
Yet even after the decision in GVTA, advertisements on the sides of a buses
are a form of expression open only to those that can afford to pay for it.
Although GVTA tried to argue that its policy against political
advertisements was justified because GVTA needed to provide "a safe,
welcoming, public transit system'," the Court disagreed. In its section 1
analysis, the Court found that there was no rational connection between the
need for a welcoming environment and a ban on political expression because
" GVTA, supra note 1 at para 1.
so Ibid at para 43 [emphasis in original].
' Ibid at paras 76-80.
8 Ibid at paras 30-36. See also Elaine Craig, "Section 2(b) Advertising Rights on
Government Property: Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority, A New Can of
Worms and the Liberty Two-Step?" (2010) 33:1 Dal LJ 55 at 61.
8 GVTA, supra note 1 at para 42.
8 Ibid at paras 39-47.
5 Ibidat para75.
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"[c]itizens, including bus riders, are expected to put up with some
controversy in a free and democratic society."" As in Guignard, the limiting
of the ban to a particular type of expression proved fatal to the government's
claim in GVTA.
When it comes to access to or use of public spaces, including public
property, for the purposes of free expression, the courts have developed a
balancing act. This balancing should come as no surprise given that no rights
are absolute and are limited by the rights of others,8 7 yet in the cases
examined in this Part there are some worrying trends. It is clear that the
Supreme Court has an ideal type of expression in public spaces and publicly
accessible property. Ideally, the expressive activity should impose no cost on
the public and it should not be overly disruptive to members of the public or
to the primary function of the place. Signs affixed to the publicly visible side
of a privately owned building are perhaps the ideal form of expression. Yet
not everyone owns a building to which they can affix signs.
By examining the section I analyses in these cases, it is also possible to
deduce some guidelines for those bodies responsible for regulating public
spaces and property. The first and most obvious guideline is that total bans
on expressive activity in places that meet the historical use test will generally
be unacceptable. Similarly, bans on a certain category ofexpression-such as
political or commercial expression-will also be struck down. If there is a
complete ban on certain forms of expressive activity, the ban may be upheld
if there is a way for the public body to grant exemptions." In the context of
86 Ibid at paras 76-77.
* See SL v Commission scolaire des Chines, 2012 SCC 7 at para 31 ("this Court has often
repeated that no right is absolute"), [2012] 1 SCR 235; SyndicatNorthcrest vAmselem,
2004 SCC 47 at para 62 ("[t] he ultimate protection of any particular Charter right must
be measured in relation to other rights and with a view to the underlying context in which
the apparent conflict arises"), [2004] 2 SCR 551.
8 For a critique of the Court's section 1 analysis in freedom of expression cases in general,
see Moon, "Justified Limits", supra note 58.
8 See e.g. Quebec Inc, supra note 20 at para 90 (Montreal's permit system); Ramsden, supra
note 51 at 1107 (Court suggesting charging fees or preserving some space for posters). See
also Vancouver (City) v Zhang, 2010 BCCA 450 at paras 48, 67, 9 BCLR (5th) 59
(striking down a bylaw against erecting structures on public streets as unconstitutional
because it did not have a clear procedure for granting exemptions).
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exemptions, however, Binnie J.'s critique in Quebec Inc remains powerful:
exemptions have the potential to leave much to the municipality's
discretion.90 In effect, the balancing seen in the Court's section I analysis in
these cases is not so much the balancing of the right to free expression with
other rights, but the balancing of free expression with the government's
power to regulate property.
When taken together, the Court's implicit guidelines for public bodies
and its preferred type of expressive behaviour place a burden on individuals
wishing to express themselves on public property. Members of the public are
allowed to access and use public property in order to express themselves, but
they must do so in a way that fits with the role of such property and they
must not completely block other members of the public from accessingsuch
property. In addition, they must be quiet and not cause any potential
hazards, no matter how far-fetched those hazards might seem. It is best if the
expression on public property is as unobtrusive and as impermanent as
possible. Through tacit references to nuisance, property appears in the case
law on free expression and works to discipline individuals by granting free
expression only to those that behave themselves appropriately.
III. BATTYAND WHA TCOTT: BEHAVE YOURSELF
The Supreme Court of Canada has been explicit about the need for, and
desirability of, peaceful urban environments.9 ' It is clear from the
jurisprudence, however, that the Court takes a surprisingly restrictive view of
what peaceful urban environments look like. The Court does not just mean
peaceful in the sense of nonviolent, but also peaceful in the sense of quiet. In
fact, according to the jurisprudence, the two have somehow become linked
such that expression that is overly disruptive, either because it is noisy or
because it takes over public property, is seen as problematic and undesirable.
Two recent lower court decisions, Batty and Whatcott, highlight this logic
with unusual clarity and illustrate the ways in which a particular vision of
public property underlies the jurisprudence on using certain locations for
free expression. In this section, I first provide some background to these cases
9o Supra note 20 at paras 170-71.
91 See e.g. Quebec Inc, supra note 20 at para 89.
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before examining how they uphold the logic of nuisance and the idea that
the right to free expression is for those who behave themselves.
Batty and Whatcott appear as the photographic negatives of each other.
Batty centred on whether a number of people could legitimately occupy a
municipal park for the purposes of free expression. Toronto's objection to
their occupation stemmed from the damage and disruption they caused to
the park rather than any inherent objection to Occupy Toronto's message.92
By contrast, Whatcott dealt with whether the University of Calgary could
ban an individual from their campus because said individual affixed flyers to
parked cars. At no stage did Whatcott ask to remain on campus indefinitely,
nor did he cause any damage to campus property; the university's objection
to Whatcott's presence stemmed from the "offensive" content of his flyers."
Batty arose out of the actions of Occupy Toronto, a Canadian branch of
the worldwide Occupy movement that began with Occupy Wall Street in the
fall of 2011. Although the aims of the Occupy movement were not
necessarily clear or shared between the various groups," the movement is
generally considered to be a response to the current and growing economic
inequality.95 In particular, the Occupy movement took issue with the large
government bailouts offered to the multinational financial institutions whose
practices precipitated the international economic crisis of 2008.96 The
movement argues that the current global financial system benefits a minority,
hinders democracy, and is inherently unstable.9 7 The Occupy movement
12 Batty, supra note 12 at paras 45-49.
93 hatcott, supra note 13 at para 4.
' Of the four named occupiers in Batty, each gave a different explanation for the
movement's origin and goals. Batty, supra note 12 at paras 35-36.
9 Alice Drury& MarkJ Rankin, "Capitalism: A Blunt Instrument" (2012) 37Alternative
LJ 76 at 76; Sarah Kunstler, "The Right to Occupy - Occupy Wall Street and the First
Amendment" (2011-2012) 39 Fordham Urb LJ 989 at 989-992; David Nugent,
"Democracy, temporalities of capitalism, and dilemmas of inclusion in Occupy
movements" (2012) 39:2American Ethnologist 280 at 281.
96 For an analysis of this crisis, see generally Michael Lewis, The Big Short: Inside the
Doomsday Machine (NewYork: WW Norton & Company, 2010).
97 See "The 99% Declaration" (9August 2012), online: <www.the99declaration.org>. See
also Batty, supra note 12 at para 27.
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claims to rely on "participatory" democracy, which is arguably a response to
what the movement sees as the undemocratic influence oflarge corporations
on the political process in otherwise democratic countries. 98 The movement's
preferred tactics involved the "occupation" of public areas such as parks and
plazas; the occupiers would use such encampments to stage rallies and
marches. Unsurprisingly, such tactics-particularly the occupation ofpublic
spaces-gave rise to a number of court cases.99
In contrast to the relative newness of the Occupy movement, Whatcott
emerged from the actions of a long-standing activist, William Whatcott.
Whatcott is but the latest case arising out of Whatcott's particular style of
public protest. Whatcott uses graphic leaflets and posters to convey his views
about the immorality and undesirability of both abortion and
homosexuality."oo Not surprisingly, his actions often cause offense and have
resulted in numerous court cases.'o' The particular case I examine in this
article centres on Whatcott's activities on the University of Calgary campus
in Calgary, Alberta. In 2005, the University of Calgary used the Trespass to
PremisesActo2 to ban Whatcott from its campus after Whatcott distributed
anti-abortion pamphlets .1 3 Three years later, campus security arrested
Whatcott as he put anti-gay flyers on vehicles in one of the university's
parking lots. 0 At trial, the court noted that Whatcott's original ban was
* See e.g. ibid at paras 8, 36.
" See e.g. Waller v City ofNew York, 34 Misc (3d) 371, 933 NYS (2d) 541 (Sup Ct 2011);
Miller-Jacobson v City ofRochester, 35 Misc (3d) 846,941 NYS (2d) 475 (Sup Ct 2012);
Occupy Sacramento v City ofSacramento, 878 F Supp (2d) 1110, 2012 WL 2839853 (Cal
Dist Ct 2012); Occupy Boston v City ofBoston, 29 Mass LR 337, 2011 WL 7460294
(Super Ct 2011); City ofLondon vSamede, [2012] EWCA Civ 160, [2012] WLR(D) 41,
aff'g [2012] EWHC 34 (QB).
o See e.g. Tobi Cohen, "Whatcott defends anti-gay flyers as case lands in Supreme Court",
The [Montreal] Gazette (12 October 2011), online: The Gazette
<http://www.montrealgazette.com>.
'' See e.g. supra note 16.
102 RSA 2000, c T-7 [Trespass to Premises Act].
103 See Whatcott, supra note 13.
' Ibidatpara4.
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motivated by the content of his flyers.' Similarly, in 2008, an unnamed
individual made campus security aware of Whatcott's presence by
complaining about the contentofhis flyers.'o6 When campus security charged
Whatcott with trespass, he argued that he had the right to be on university
property under section 2(b) of the Charter.'0 7 Both at trial and on appeal, the
courts considered both the original trespass notice together with its
later enforcement.
Batty also dealt with the constitutionality of a trespass notice. After four
weeks of continuous "occupation" in St. James Park in downtown Toronto,
the city issued the protesters a trespass notice under the Trespass to Property
Act.'0o The occupation consisted ofnumerous structures, including hundreds
of tents, three yurts, and a tree house.'" Ontario's trespass legislation differs
from Alberta's in that, in Ontario, the rightful owners or possessors of
property can declare certain behaviours to be trespass." 0 Toronto's trespass
notice did not constitute an absolute ban on Occupy Toronto's use of the
park; it merely sought to prevent Occupy Toronto from using the park
between the hours of 12:01 a.m. and 5:30 a.m. and to prevent the protestors
from erecting any structures in the park."' These limits are the same limits
that attach to all users of Toronto's municipal parks under the City's
parks bylaw. 1 2
A key difference between Batty and Whatcott is how willing each court
was to accept the argument that each case was really about regulating access
to and use of property. From the start of his judgment in Batty, Brown J.
framed the issue as being more about property than freedom of expression.
He even opened with the lines: "How do we live together in a community?
'1 Ibid at para 24.
'06 Ibidatpara4.
107 R v Whatcott, 2011 ABPC 336 at paras 1-3, 514 AR 154.
'os RSO 1990, c T.21 [Trespass to PropertyAct].
'09 See Batty, supra note 12 at paras 28-29.
' See Trespass to PropertyAct, supra note 108, ss 2(l)(a)(ii), 4(1).
... See Batty, supra note 12 at para 4.
112 Ibidat para 58.
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How do we share common space ?""' and suggested that these were the real
questions that Occupy Toronto posed to the world."' In Whatcott, the
University of Calgary attempted to claim that it handed out trespass notices
to anyone on their campus who did "anything basically that is not associated
with the proper use of the property which is attending school [and]
working.""' In short, the university seemed to think that it had the right to
exclude any unaffihiated person from its campus. The right to exclude is, of
course, generally considered to be the sine qua non of private property
rights."' Rather than answer the question of whether the University of
Calgary has private property rights, Whatcott focuses on the university's use
of "provincial trespass legislation to respond to an individual's complaint
concerning the content of Mr. Whatcott's flyer."' 17 As such, Whatcott was
more about freedom of expression than property.
Somewhat confusingly, Whatcott's constitutional challenge was to the
university's application of the legislation rather than the legislation itself."'
Alberta's trespass legislation, like that of other provinces, does not
differentiate between private property and public property. The slightly
strained attempt to link the application of the Trespass to PremisesAct with
the actions of the university rather than the actions of the state avoids a
potentially problematic outcome: linking any enforcement of trespass
legislation to state action. In 1991, Litman argued that any attempt to
enforce trespass legislation would be considered state action and in this way
the Charter's protections, specifically the guarantee of free expression, would
be engaged." 9 Such an outcome would, of course, severely limit the
" Ibidat para 1.
" Ibidatpara3.
115 Whatcott, supra note 13 at para 4.
" See e.g. Thomas W Merrill, "Property and the Right to Exclude" (1998) 77:4 Neb L Rev
730 ("the right to exclude others is more than just 'one of the most essential' constituents
of property-it is the sine qua non" at 730). A critique of Merrill's claim is beyond the
scope of this article.
117 Whatcott, supra note 13 at para 24.
11 Ibidatpara25.
"9 Litman, supra note 19 at 401-06.
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application of trespass legislation, as all kinds of property could become fair
game for protestors.
Despite Whatcott's best efforts to avoid the outcome that Litman
envisaged in 1991, the Court actually uses the link between enforcement of
trespass legislation with state action to further chastise the University of
Calgary. In his judgment, Jeffrey J. noted that "the University is not
appearing as litigant to enforce its private property rights but the Crown
appearing as litigant to enforce the laws and interests of the state, armed with
all the machinery of the state. Such action is subject to Charter scrutiny."'20
Such a statement seems redundant, as up until that point Jeffrey J's line of
reasoning was that because the university's attempt to ban Whatcott
constituted the "denial of a learning opportunity", there was "a direct
connection between the institution's governmental mandate and the
impugned activity" which meant the Charter applied."' However, this line
of reasoning does not deal with the property issues raised by the University
of Calgary: Does the university have private property rights or not?
The best answer that Whatcott can provide is maybe. Certainly, the
university's characterization of how it regulates its own property is untrue.
The University of Calgary's campus is clearly held out as open to the public
and members of the public can and do access the campus. In fact, any
member of the public is entitled to use the university's libraries or skate in the
Olympic Oval, though fees may be levied for both services."' Of course,
under Canadian jurisprudence, private property owners can hold out their
property as open to the public and remain able to fully rely on provincial
trespass legislation.'23
20 Whatcott, supra note 13 at para 36.
12 Ibidat para 30.
122 University of Calgary Library, Access Policies, (15 April 1999), online: University of
Calgary Library, <http://ibrary.ucalgary.ca/policies/access-policies>; University of
Calgary Olympic Oval, Public Skating, online: <http://www.oval.ucalgary.ca/
10 public-skating>.
12 In such instances Harrison remains good law. Seesupra notes 18 to 21 and accompanying
text. See also Philip Girard & Jim Phillips, "A Certain 'Mallaise': Harrison v Carswell,
Shopping Centre Picketing, and the Limits ofthe Post-war Settlement" in Judy Fudge &
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The Ontario Court ofAppeal had earlier grappled with the question over
the nature of university property in Queen's University. The court noted that
the university's campus was comprised of "privately owned buildings ... as
well as municipally owned public streets"124 In short, there was nothing that
necessarily set the campus apart from any other neighbourhood in the city.
The Court found that although the public had an invitation to enter some of
Queen's University's buildings, this invitation did not extend to all its
buildings."' This finding proved crucial to the outcome of the case, as the
Court found that striking employees could not picket in university
residences as there was no standing invitation for the public to remain inside
such buildings.' 2 6
Queen's University does not shed much light on the decision in Whatcott.
In Whatcott, there was no attempt to enter any university building, nor were
there any attempts to seek out confrontations with university students. One
might expect that had Whatcott accessed Queen's campus rather than
Calgary's, the outcome of the case would have been the same. Perhaps the
only conclusion that can be drawn from the reasoning in Whatcott is that
when institutions are acting as government, they cannot regulate their
property in the same way as private property owners. Hence, on occasion, the
role of the university might attach to its property and turn it from private
to public.
The property issues in Batty were much simpler than in Whatcott, as St.
James Park was clearly public property. Justice Brown offered a detailed
description of the City of Toronto's efforts to regulate its parks fairly. The
understanding of public space, and in particular public parks, as discussed by
Eric Tucker, eds, Work on Trial: Canadian Labour Law Struggles (Toronto: Osgoode
Society for Canadian Legal History and Irwin Law, 2010) 249 at 272-73.
124 Queens University, supra note 22 at 719.
125 Ibid at 725-26.
126 Ibid at 725-26. The employees were attempting to access the exception available under
Ontario's labour laws that would have allowed them to picket on private property held
out as open to the public. See supra note 22.
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Brown J. echoed C.B. Macpherson's definition of common property.
According to Macpherson, common property is that property from which an
individual has the right not to be excluded. Macpherson understood
.common property" to be a type of public property, but used the term
"common" to differentiate property such as parks from the state's private
property interests. Given that Macpherson included parks and streets as
examples of common property, he understood government to have a role in
ensuring that the right not to be excluded is upheld."' In Batty, the Court
and the city clearly felt that everyone had the right not to be excluded from
public parks.
The Court repeatedly described Occupy Toronto as appropriating the
park and preventing others from using it.12 9 Moreover, the City argued that
the exclusionary effects of Occupy Toronto would continue even after the
encampment ended, as the City would need to perform repairs and
maintenance to the park. In particular, the City would need to erect fences to
give the grass time to regrow.o Such a statement seems to clash with
Toronto's earlier claim that it only wanted to prevent Occupy Toronto from
using the park at night."'
In Batty, the City of Toronto successfully argued that its response to
Occupy Toronto was justified, given the need to maintain the park and keep
it open for all. Occupy Toronto attempted to argue that the public could still
access and use the park during the occupation, and that even if they could
not, there were other parks available.'32 The Court disagreed with both of
Occupy Toronto's claims and accepted Toronto's argument that St. James
Park was something of a unique "urban oasis." 3 Furthermore, as the City
117 Batty, supra note 12 at paras 14-15,43,45, 57,123; CB Macpherson, "The Meaning of
Property" in CB Macpherson, ed, Property:Mainstream and Critical Positions (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1978) 1 at 4-5.
125 Ibid at 4.
9 Batty, supra note 12 at paras 12, 40, 51, 94, 108, 113.
130 Ibid at para 46.
13 Ibidatpara50.
132 Ibid at paras 39-40, 103.
133 Ibidat para 25.
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claimed that it only wanted to prohibit Occupy Toronto during the night
and to require the protestors use the park in the same way as other users, the
Court found that while the enforcement of the trespass notice would
infringe the protestor's section 2(b) rights, the infringement was minimal
and proportional and so was saved by section 1 of the Charter.'? In short,
Occupy Toronto remained able to use St. James Park, but only so long as
their use complied with the City of Toronto's parks bylaws.
Perhaps the most striking difference between Batty and Whatcott is how
each Court described the persons who sought to claim a violation of the
right to free expression. In Whatcott, the Court repeatedly referenced the
peaceful nature ofWhatcott's actions.' In fact, in its section I analysis, the
Court called the university's response disproportional given Whatcott's ready
cooperation with campus security."' While Whatcott is repeatedly described
as cooperative, the same cannot be said for Occupy Toronto in Batty.
Although the Court does not explicitly call it a nuisance, the Occupy
Toronto protest is described as noisy and smelly,"' which are two typical
examples of nuisance."' More importantly, Brown J.'s judgment repeatedly
implies that Occupy Toronto were violent or, at the very least, threatening.
The judgment, for example, quotes from the affidavit of a local resident who
claimed that she felt so unsafe that, rather than walk past the Occupy
encampment, she avoided it completely." Occupy Toronto is also depicted
as uncooperative: not only did Occupy Toronto not secure the appropriate
permits from the City for their use of the park, but, by building their tree
house, the protestors also breached Brown J.'s order, which he issued as part
of an interim stay on the proceedings. 40
1 Ibidat paras 75, 111, 122-24.
135 Whatcott, supra note 13 at paras 4,6, 36.
136 Ibid at paras 44, 48.
137 Batty, supra note 12 at paras 42,44,46.
138 Henry E Smith, "Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law ofNuisance" (2004) 90:4Va L
Rev 965 at 997-99.
139 Batty, supra note 12 at para 42.
o Ibid at paras 53-54.
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In both cases, the Courts tacitly implied that the losing party was guilty
of hypocrisy. In Whatcott, the Court referenced the constitutio habita of
1158, which "guarantee[d] the right of a travelling scholar to unhindered
passage in the interest of education."1 4 ' The Court went on to quote from the
University of Calgary's commitment to freedom of expression, as discussed
in the university's planning guide.142 According to the University ofCalgary,
its statutory mandate included the provision of "a platform for the exchange
of ideas and advancement of knowledge""' Hence, the university's attempt
to ban Whatcott led Jeffrey J. to wonder, "Are only select viewpoints now
permissible on our university campuses?"" Such was the apparent hypocrisy
of the university that the Court did not find the "prevention of the
distribution of leaflets" to "relate to an objective that was pressing
and substantial" 45
Similarly, in Batty, Brown J. observed that the Occupy movement did not
practise what it preached. He noted that the movement claimed to want a
more participatory democracy, yet they appropriated a public park without
asking for permission. '4 Occupy Toronto may have claimed to be more
egalitarian, but in Batty they are depicted as selfish and unwilling to share
"their" park.' 7 In addition, Batty repeatedly references the ideas ofchaos and
anarchy, suggesting that Occupy Toronto's actions had the potential to
threaten the very foundations of Canadian society."' In Batty, the City of
Toronto's actions appeared reasonable while Occupy Toronto seemed
hypocritical and threatening, whereas in Whatcott, Whatcott's behaviour was
never anything less than legal while the University of Calgary seemed
irrational and overbearing.
41 Whatcott, supra note 13 at para 4 (citing the trial judge's findings of fact).
142 Ibidat para 4. The quoted passage does not explicitly mention free expression, but it does
reference the related concept of academic freedom.
143 Ibidatpara32.
'44Ibid at para 33.
41 Ibid at para 48.
146 Batty, supra note 12 at para 9.
117 Ibid at para 42.
148 Ibid at paras 2, 91-92.
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Arguably, in both Batty and Whatcott, the Courts reached the right
decision. What is striking, however, is what the cases suggest when read
together. Whatcott only wanted temporary access to the University of
Calgary's campus to put leaflets on cars. At no stage did he threaten or
attempt to engage with university personnel. He acted in a peaceful and
cooperative manner and he acted alone. There was nothing in Whatcott's
behaviour that clashed with the role of a university and its property. In short,
Whatcott's actions were not attention grabbing, and anyone walking past
could have easily failed to notice him or his message. In contrast, Occupy
Toronto proved impossible to ignore. First, they took over an entire park,
built structures, and had campfires and drumming circles. Then, they refused
to comply with the City ofToronto's bylaws or with Brown J.'s interim order.
Even if Occupy Toronto behaved legally, they were a highly disruptive and
noticeable presence, and they prevented the park from being used as a park.
These two cases suggest, in keeping with the jurisprudence discussed in Part
II, that so long as you are quiet, cooperative, and your behaviour does not
interfere with the role of the property which you seek to access for purposes
of free expression, you have a better chance of being allowed to access such
property for those purposes.
IV. THE PROBLEMATIC LOGIC OF NUISANCE
Given that all Charter rights are limited by law and that no rights are
absolute,'49 it is perhaps not surprising that some balancing ofcompeting uses
takes place when the location of the right to free expression is at issue. In the
cases examined in this article, the courts use the logic of nuisance to assess
whether the expression at issue is compatible with its location. In effect, the
logic of nuisance results in a balancing of uses that seems to balance the
public's right to continue to use and access public property with the right of
free expression. As important as it is for Canadian courts to seek to balance
one person's rights with another's, in the context of free expression the logic
of nuisance is too restrictive. Nuisance relies heavily on the idea of peaceful
enjoyment, and when applied to public property the logic of nuisance does
not leave enough room for democratic discourse. This logic ofnuisance runs
"9 See supra note 87.
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counter to the Supreme Court's own observation that "[c]itizens . . . are
expected to put up with some controversy in a free and democratic
society."o50 More worryingly, the case law suggests a preference for expression
that does not impose any burdens on the public, which has the potential to
give those with private property rights stronger rights to free expression than
those without them. For example, the posters in Ramsden were something of
a nuisance, while the sign in Guignard was an optimum form of expression.
Furthermore, in the context of publicly owned and accessible property, the
logic of nuisance often defers to the governments power to regulate uses of
public property rather than balancing actual uses. In this section, I begin
with a brief discussion about the right to free expression before moving on to
explore why the logic of nuisance does not leave enough room for free
expression and how it relates to the balancing done under section 1 of
the Charter.
Jamie Cameron describes the right to free expression as a test of courage
for democracies."' She argues that the Supreme Court of Canada does not
yet have a theory of free expression that "explains why [the] freedom matters
and why it should be protected.""' According to Cameron's study of the
Court's freedom of expression jurisprudence, the Court has tended to
uphold reasonable limits on free expression rather than protecting free
expression by "a margin of about two to one."" Although the Court
frequently mentions the importance of free expression, it would seem as
though they lack the courage of their convictions and are too quick to justify
limits on free expression. Moon echoes Cameron's observation about the
judicial deference seen in section 2(b) claims.'54 For Moon, the problem is
that the Court assumes that freedom of expression is merely a right to be free
from state interference rather than recognizing the "social or relational"
aspect of the right to free expression."' Moon argues that the social nature of
Iso GVTA, supra note 1 at para 77.
1' Cameron, "Reflection", supra note 8 at 164.
152 Ibid at 194.
151 Ibid at 168.
"4 Moon, "Justified Limits", supra note 58 at 365.
' Ibid at 340.
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the right to free expression proves an awkward fit for constitutional
jurisprudence, which "assumes a bright line between the protected right or
interest of the individual ... and the conflicting interests or rights of other
individuals or of the collective". " 6As such, the balancing act under section 1
becomes increasingly difficult, resulting in a "broad definition" of section
2(b)'s scope coupled with a "deferential approach to limits under
section 1."117
The jurisprudence shows that the right to free expression does not
automatically grant individuals the right to access property, particularly
property that the individual does not own, for the purpose of expressing
themselves."' Nor will the Court uphold free expression where it "impos[es]
on the government a signficant burden of assistance, in the form of
expenditure of public funds, or the initiation of a complex legislative,
regulatory, or administrative scheme or undertaking.""' Section 2(b) does
not grant any positive rights to express oneself. The right of free expression is
also vulnerable to accusations that the expression at issue is harmful,
discriminatory, of no value,' or simply not allowed in the area where it is
taking place."' Although Cameron has criticized the Court's contextual
approach to section 2(b),'16 2 such an approach does recognize that free
156 Ibid at 340,365.
15 Ibid at 365.
158 See especially Harrison, supra note 18. See also Girard & Phillips, supra note 123 at
257, 266.
' GVTA, supra note 1 at para 103 [emphasis in original]. The Supreme Court refers to the
following cases as additional authority on this point: R vBigMDrugMartLtd, [1985] 1
SCR 295 at 336, 18 DLR (4th) 321; Haig v Canada, [199312 SCR 995 at 1035, 105
DLR(4th) 577; Native Women'sAssn ofCanada v Canada, [1994]3 SCR 627,119DLR
(4th) 224; Delisle v Canada (Deputy Attorney General), [ 1999] 2 SCR 989 at paras 25-
26,176 DLR (4th) 513; Baier vAlberta, 2007 SCC 31 at paras 20,33, 35-36,43, [2007]
2 SCR673.
16o See Jamie Cameron, "The Past, Present, and Future of Expressive Freedom under the
Charter" (1997) 35:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 1 at 19, 60 [Cameron, "Past, Present, and
Future"]; Cameron, "Reflection", supra note 8 at 172.
16, See e.g. Quebec Inc, supra note 20 at paras 91, 100.
162 Cameron, "Reflection", supra note 8 at 164, 172-73.
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expression does not take place in a vacuum and must be balanced with
other concerns.
Arguably, the right to free expression's relationship or lack thereof with
property is one of the most important aspects of the right. After all, free
expression has to take place somewhere and, as expression is an inherently
social act, there is not much point to the right if it is forbidden or severely
restricted in public places.' Of course, public places are used for more than
just free expression, and, as such, the right to free expression must be
balanced with other uses of public places. In the jurisprudence examined in
this article, that balancing uses the logic of nuisance.
Historically, nuisance arose out of the idea that a person should use his or
her property in a way that does not harm others.'" Nuisance developed in
such a way that it "offered absolute protection to plaintiffs: either the
nuisance existed and an injunction was granted or courts avoided granting an
injunction by deciding that no nuisance existed."65 In short, nuisance allows
for the control of others in the use of their property but also limits how an
individual uses their own property: uses must not be overly disruptive to
adjacent properties. Henry Smith describes the modern law of nuisance as a
governance strategy because nuisance requires a balancing of rights and uses,
and is a little more complex, or "higher cost", than simpler, exclusion-based
regimes.' 6 As true as Smith's characterization is, what must be noted is that
under traditional nuisance law, the balancing of uses is a balancing between
two uses that are not actually taking place on the same piece of property.
When it comes to balancing different uses of public property, the different
uses are often taking place on the same piece of property.6 7
163 See Zick, supra note 1 at 173.
164 See Christopher Harvey, "History ofNuisance" in Pun & Hall,supra note 6, 18 at 22-25.
165 Timothy Swanson & Andreas Kontoleon, "Nuisance" in Boudewijn Bouckaert, ed,
Property Law andEconomics (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2010) 161 at 161.
166 Henry E Smith, "Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance" (2004) 90 Va L
Rev 965 at 982; Henry E Smith, "Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for
Delineating Property Rights" (2002) 31 J Legal Stud S453 at S455.
167 See e.g. Valverde, Everyday Law, supra note 70 at 24-47 (examining the various uses and
associated law for a single street corner in Toronto).
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In the context of regulating the uses of public property, the logic of
nuisance tends to privilege one use above others. Mariana Valverde argues,
for example, that zoning legislation is a tool used by the urban middle class,
who dominate urban governance, as a way to push "nuisances" such as noise
and industrial concerns to discrete parts of the city far away from their
homes.' 8 The aim of zoning legislation is not to balance competing uses but
rather to strictly delineate acceptable uses. Similarly, the historical use test
employs the logic of nuisance as a threshold that requires free expression to
comply with the primary uses of the property where it takes place, thus
limiting the availability of public property for free expression.
When it comes to the relationship between free expression and property
rights, the logic of nuisance imposes too high a standard for instances of free
expression. Given that nuisance requires a balancing of rights and uses, it
does echo, to some degree, the balancing of and limits to rights envisaged by
section 1 of the Charter. However, nuisance's balancing act arose in the
context of private property rights and seeks to protect those rights as far as
possible. When applied to public property, the logic of nuisance might seem
to recognize that the public has equal rights to public property and that these
rights must be balanced with expressive rights, but it actually defers to the
primary use of public property. While the Supreme Court recognizes that
the primary functions of streets are for both getting from one place to
another and for communication,' 69 the preference of the government is
clearly the former use rather than the latter.170
In the jurisprudence discussed in Part II, the Court adopts a deferential
stance towards the public authorities' powers of regulation and carefully
examines the purposes behind the allegedly unconstitutional legislation.
Where the challenged regulation is found to be a law, the courts will
generally find that the law meets the first part of the four-part Oakes test for
' Mariana Valverde, "Seeing Like a City: The Dialectic ofModern and Premodern Ways of
Seeing in Urban Governance" (2011) 45:2 Law & Soc'y Rev 277 at 286-87.
16 See e.g. Quebec Inc, supra note 20 at para 67.
170 See Valverde, Everyday Law, supra note 70 at 39-40, 42. See also Blomrley, "Civil Rights",
supra note 60 at 59 (noting that civil engineers define a good street as one which "resolves
itself in favour of flow").
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justifiability under section 1."' The decision in Whatcott offers an exception
to this pattern, as the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench found that preventing
the distribution of leaflets was not a pressing and substantial objective."'
Whatcott notwithstanding, the effect of the courts'general deference to the
objectives behind challenged regulations is to give the government similar
rights as a private property owner to control how their property is used, or,
as in Guignard and Quebec Inc, to control uses ofothers'property that impact
theirs. 74 The issue is not whether the free expression impedes the public's use
of the public property at issue, or, in Guignard, of the adjacent public
property, but whether the free expression fits with the government's
regulation of the property.
The deference extended to the government does not always result in the
challenged law being upheld. Where the challenged laws typically fail to be
saved under section 1, if they fail, is in how they go about achieving the
pressing and substantial objectives. In Ramsden, for example, the Court held
that Peterborough's bylaw failed because it was overbroad, while in GVTA,
the GVTA's advertising policy failed because was there was no rational
connection between the policy and the objectives it sought to achieve.'75 Yet
the kind of balancing done under section 1, as noted above,"' leaves much to
the government's discretion and does not make it clear who can access public
property, and under what circumstances they can access it, for the purpose of
free expression. While I agree that courts and municipalities should guard
against the potential appropriation of public property seen in Batty, they
17' The Oakes test comes from R v Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103 at 138-40,26 DLR (4th) 200.
See also The Honourable Marshall Rothstein, "Section 1: Justifying Breaches of Charter
Rights and Freedoms" (1999-2000) 27:2 Man LJ 171 at 171-73 (describing how the
Oakes test works), 174 (noting that very few cases fail under the first part of the
Oakes test).
172 Watcott, supra note 13 at para 48.
173 See Harrison, supra note 18 at 213, 216-17.
174 For a critical engagement with how the jurisprudence treats public property, see Sarah E
Hamill, "Private Rights to Public Property: The Evolution of Common Property in
Canada" (2012) 58:2 McGill LJ 365.
175 See GVTA, supra note 1 at para 76.
176 See Part II, above.
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should also guard against the risk of silencing free expression by privileging
that which is quiet, unobtrusive, and taking place on private property. As
important as it might be for the courts to ensure that any limits on free
expression are in fact justifiable under the law, what is lacking from the
jurisprudence is-as Cameron notes-a discussion of why free expression is
important and evidence of a strong commitment to it.'7 7 What the
jurisprudence offers, particularly the jurisprudence where the location of the
expression is a key issue, is a commitment to a nuisance-free, litter-free, quiet
society where we can get from A to B without being obstructed by
democratic rights. The courts'preference for quiet and unobtrusive forms of
free expression risks giving greater protection to the expressive rights of those
individuals with the resources to meet these standards, for example, property
owners, as in Guzgnard.
Ironically, the logic of nuisance used by the Supreme Court would be
appropriate if the Charter did not exist. Without the Charter, the logic of
nuisance would be a powerful judicial defence of the public's right to free
speech because it would allow the Court to paint free expression as a
reasonable use of public property. Under the common law, the public had a
right to access and use certain instances of public property, and in a pre-
Charter world the public's right of access would have arguably included the
right to communicate on such property, provided such communication was
peaceful. 78 The pre-Charter case of Saumur v City of Quebec'7 1 provides an
interesting illustration of the right of individuals to communicate on public
streets. In Saumur, the Supreme Court struck down a Quebec City bylaw
that required individuals wishing to distribute pamphlets or leaflets to seek
the permission of the chief of police. The majority found that the bylaw was
ultra vires the city because the bylaw's subject matter was in the exclusive
jurisdiction of the federal government.' The City had attempted to claim
117 Cameron, "Past, Present, and Future" supra note 160 at 4-5; Cameron, "Reflection" supra
note 8 at 163-64.
178 See "Public Order and the Right of Assembly in England and the United States: A
Comparative Study" (1937-38) 47:3 Yale LJ 404.
17 [1953] 2 SCR 299, [1953] 4 DLR 641 [Saumur cited to SCR].
180 Ibid at 322, 332-34.
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that its bylaw was justified on the grounds that it related to "the
administration of streets", but the Court found that it granted too wide a
discretion to the police chief and doubted that the bylaw's true purpose was
what the City had claimed."' As Estey J. put it, the "[d]istribution of
pamphlets and other printed matter has taken place since time immemorial
and it is significant that no instance was mentioned where the distribution of
such ever constituted a nuisance or an interference with the health of the
people or the cleanliness of the city.""' Such a statement offers a stark
contrast to the Court's later ready acceptance of the need to prevent litter
and various safety hazards as a pressing and substantial objective in
Ramsden." Yet, rather than supplement the common law right ofaccess, the
Charter and its subsequent jurisprudence appears to have added a restrictive
gloss. Only those individuals who respect the "primary function" of that
property are allowed to access it for the purpose of free expression. Similarly,
the decision in Quebec Inc suggests that the Court is now more sanguine
about leaving decisions over access to the discretion of municipal officials
than they were in Saumur.
It is perhaps unlikely that Canadian courts will grant a blanket right of
access to public property for the purposes of free expression, but there are
some ways that the current situation can be improved. In GVTA, the
Supreme Court observed that free expression can be disruptive and
controversial, but that these features are not ones that must always be
prevented in every situation. '"Although in GVTA the Court appeared to be
referring solely to the political content of the advertisements that the
transportation authority refused to post, this understanding should be
extended to cases similar to the other ones discussed in Part II. As evidenced
by the Supreme Court of Canada's comments in GVTA, their concern is to
avoid imposing financial or administrative burdens on the government.'"'
This stance may well explain why, in Ramsden, the Court so readily accepted
"Ibid at 332-33.
182 Ibid at 361.
183 Supra note 51 at 1105.
184 GVTA, supra note 1 at para 77.
185 Ibid at para 105. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
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the need to prevent litter as a pressing and substantial objective and
suggested that an acceptable alternative to Peterborough's complete ban
would be a fee-based system."' However, discarded band posters and
political leaflets are hardly the only forms of litter in an urban landscape, and
as most municipalities already allot a portion of their budget to dealingwith
litter, posters and leaflets can hardly be considered to be an excessive burden
on governments.At the same time, imposing costs for accessingpublic spaces
for the purposes of free expression could pose a burden on individuals
seeking to express themselves. The social costs of free expression, whether
they come in the form of litter, hurt feelings, or noisy streets, are hardly
unique to free expression, and so free expression should not be silenced as a
way of limiting these social costs.
The Supreme Court has recognized that streets are also used for
communicative purposes, but it has not done enough to unpack this purpose
and link it with its understanding of free expression. In particular, it has not
done enough to preserve access to the communicative function of public
property for all. The closing off of some public property, creating so-called
"dead zones" of free speech,1 7 and the wide discretion granted to
governments in regulating access works to devalue the communicative
aspects of public property. If the Court takes section 2(b) as seriously as it
claims to, it must not be too quick to subordinate the right to free expression
to the demands of those who wish to have peaceful, aesthetically-pleasing,
and hazard-free public spaces.
V. CONCLUSION
Section 2(b) of the Charter grants "freedom of thought, belief, opinion and
expression, including freedom of the press and other media of
communication"'" yet the jurisprudence has a tendency to subordinate this
right to the primary function of the property on which it takes place. It is
clear that section 2(b) does not grant a blanket right of access to or use of any
186 Supra note 51 at 1107.
1 Slattery, supra note I at 245. Cf Kanter, supra note 9 at 498 (arguing that the decision in
Commonwealth ofCanada would preclude free expression in a post office).
1 Charter, supra note 1, s 2(b).
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form of property, whether that property is public or private.' 9 Rather, the
jurisprudence has had to tease out the relationship between free expression
and property rights. I have argued that this relationship is governed by the
logic of nuisance, and while it is true that free expression in public places has
the potential to be disruptive, the logic of nuisance privileges forms of
expression that the Supreme Court has described as ineffective.'90
Furthermore, the jurisprudence also strongly suggests that those with private
property rights can on some occasions silence free expression on adjacent
public property,'' or that expression located on their own property is
subjected to a higher level of protection.'
The Supreme Court has shown itself capable of recognizing the
importance of section 2(b) and protecting the rights it grants.' The Court
has, however, allowed some instances of free expression, particularly those
that take place on public property, to be viewed as nuisances and thus
unworthy of robust protection. The problem with the logic of nuisance is
that it "focuses on the harm suffered rather than on prohibited conduct''"
Such a stance makes sense in the context of private law but makes little sense
when Charter rights are at stake, because silencing free expression is arguably
a much greater harm than the disruption to the use of public property. The
harm suffered when free expression is silenced is shared by society as a whole,
whereas the harm caused by "nuisances" is typically tied to particular
locations.'" Even if free expression is a nuisance, it is one which society ought
to tolerate, because without free expression there can be no democracy.
"9 See generally Moon, "Access",supra note 1 at 339; Moon, ConstitutionalProtections, supra
note 1 at 148-49, 171-72.
9 See Guignard, supra note 71 at para 30.
'9' See e.g. the residents' comments in Batty, supra note 12 at para 42.
192 See e.g. Guignard, supra note 71 at paras 3, 34. See also supra at footnotes 78 to 88 and
accompanying text.
193 See e.g. GVTA, supra note 1 at para 91; Guignard, supra note 71 at paras 19-20.
'9 Pun & Hall, supra note 6 at 4.
1 I say "typically" because I am aware that pollution, which is often treated like a nuisance,
cannot necessarily be tied down to particular locations. See Harveysupra note 164 at 22-
25; Gregory S Pun, "Public Nuisance" in Pun & Hall, supra note 6, 33 at 36-39.
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